On Prayer and the Contemplative Life
Question LXXXI: Of the Virtue of Religion
QUESTION LXXXI OF THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION
I. Does the Virtue of Religion Direct a Man To God Alone? S. Augustine, _sermon_, cccxxxiv. 3 " _on Psalm_ lxxvi. 32 _sermon_, cccxi. 14-15 II. Is Religion a Virtue? III. Is Religion One Virtue? IV. Is Religion a Special Virtue Distinct From Others? V. Is Religion One of the Theological Virtues? VI. Is Religion To Be Preferred To the Other Moral Virtues? VII. Has Religion, Or Latria, Any External Acts? S. Augustine, _of Care for the Dead_, V. VIII. Is Religion the Same As Sanctity? Cardinal Cajetan, on the Distinction Between Sanctity and Religion
I. Does the Virtue of Religion direct a Man to God Alone?
Cicero says: "Religion offers internal and external reverence to that Superior Nature which we term the Divine."
S. Isidore says: "A religious man is, as Cicero remarks, so called from _religion_, for he is occupied with and, as it were, reads through again and again (_relegit_) the things that concern Divine worship." Thus religion seems to be so called from reading again (_religendo_) things concerning Divine worship; for such things are to be repeatedly revolved in the mind, according to those words of Proverbs iii. 6: _In all thy ways think on Him._ At the same time _religion_ might be said to be so called because "we ought to choose again (_re-eligere_) those things which through our negligence we have lost," as S. Augustine has noted. Or perhaps it is better derived from "binding again" (_religando_); thus S. Augustine says: "Let religion bind us once more to the One Almighty God."
But whether religion be so called from frequent _reading_, or from _fresh election_ of Him Whom we have negligently lost, or from _rebinding_, it properly implies a certain relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be especially _bound_ as our indefectible principle; to Him must we assiduously direct our _choice_ as our ultimate end; He it is Whom we negligently lose by sin and Whom we must regain by believing in Him and by professing our faith in Him.
But some deny that religion directs a man to God alone, thus:
1. S. James says: _Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation; and to keep oneself unspotted from this world._ But _to visit the fatherless and widows_ indicates relation to our neighbour, and _to keep oneself unspotted from this world_ refers to ourselves. Hence religion is not confined to our relationship with God.
But religion has two sorts of acts. Some belong to it properly and immediately, those acts, namely, which it elicits and by which man is directed to God alone, as, for instance, to offer Him sacrifice, to adore Him, etc.
But there are other acts which religion produces through the medium of the virtues which it controls, directing them, that is, towards reverence to God; for that virtue which is concerned with the end directs those virtues which have to do with the means to the end. And in this sense _to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation_ is said to be an act of religion because commanded by it, though actually elicited by the virtue of mercy. Similarly _to keep oneself unspotted from this world_ is an act commanded by religion, though elicited by temperance or some other virtue.
2. S. Augustine says: "Since according to the genius of the Latin speech--and that not merely of the unlearned, but even of the most learned--religion is said to be shown towards our human relatives and connexions and intimates, this word 'religion' cannot be used without some ambiguity when applied to the worship of God; hence we cannot say with absolute confidence that religion is nought else but the worship of God." Religion, then, is not limited to our relation to God, but embraces, our neighbour as well.
But it is only by an extension of the name "religion" that it is made to embrace our relations towards our human kin, it is not according to the proper signification of the word. Hence S. Augustine prefaced the words quoted from him above with the remark: "Religion, strictly speaking, seems to mean, not any kind of worship, but only that of God."
3. Further, _latria_ seems to come under religion. But S. Augustine says: "_Latria_ is interpreted as service." But we ought to serve not God only, but our neighbour as well: _By charity of the spirit serve one another._ Religion, then, implies relation to our neighbour.
But since a slave implies a master, it follows that where there exists a peculiar and special title of dominion there also will be found a peculiar and special ratio of servitude. It is clear, however, that dominion belongs to God in a peculiar and special fashion, since He it is Who has made all things and Who holds the chief rule over all things. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him. And this service is by the Greeks designated _latria_, which is, in consequence, properly comprised under "religion."
4. Again, reverence comes under religion. But man has to reverence, not only God, but his neighbour as well; as Cato says: "Reverence parents." Hence religion establishes a relation between ourselves and our neighbour as well as between ourselves and God.
But we are said to reverence those men whom we honour or remember, or to whose presence we resort. So, too, even things which are subject to us are said to be "cultivated" by us (_coli_); thus husbandmen (_agricolæ_) are so called because they "cultivate" the fields; the inhabitants of a place, too (_incolæ_), are so called because they "cultivate" the spots where they dwell. But since special honour is due to God as the First Principle of all, a special kind of "cultus" or "reverence" is His due, and this the Greeks call _eusebia_ or _theosebia_, as S. Augustine says.
5. Lastly, all who are in a state of salvation are subject to God. But not all who are in a state of salvation are called "religious," but those only who bind themselves by certain vows and observances and who undertake to obey certain men. Hence religion does not seem to mean the relationship of subjection of man to God.
But although, generally speaking, all those who worship God can be termed "religious," yet those are specially so called who dedicate their whole lives to the Divine worship and cut themselves off from worldly occupations.
Thus those are not termed "contemplatives" who merely contemplate, but they who devote their lives to contemplation. And such men do not subject themselves to men for man's sake, but for God's, as the Apostle says: _You received me as an Angel of God, even as Christ Jesus._
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_S. Augustine_: We are to abide in Christ! How then shall That not be now our possession Where we are then to abide and Whence we are to draw Life? Let Holy Scripture speak for us lest we should seem in mere conjecture to be saying things contrary to the teaching of the Word of God. Hear the words of one who knew: _If God be for us who is against us?_ _The Lord_, he says, _is the portion of my inheritance._ He saith not: Lord, what wilt Thou give me for mine inheritance? All that Thou canst give me is worthless! Be Thou mine inheritance! Thee do I love! Thee do I wholly love! With all my heart, with all my soul, with all my mind do I love Thee! What, then, shall be my lot? What wilt Thou give me save Thyself? This is to love God freely. This is to hope for God from God. This is to hasten to be filled with God, to be sated with Him. For He is sufficient for thee; apart from Him nought can suffice thee! (_Sermon_, cccxxxiv. 3).
_S. Augustine_: I cried to the Lord with my voice. Many cry to the Lord that they may win riches, that they may avoid losses; they cry that their family may be established, they ask for temporal happiness, for worldly dignities; and, lastly, they cry for bodily health, which is the patrimony of the poor. For these and suchlike things many cry to the Lord; hardly one cries for the Lord Himself! How easy it is for a man to desire all manner of things from the Lord and yet not desire the Lord Himself! As though the gift could be sweeter than the Giver! (_on Ps._ lxxvi.).
_S. Augustine:_ Picture God as saying to you--He Who re-created you and adopted you: "My son, why is it that day by day you rise and pray, and genuflect, and even strike the ground with your forehead, nay, sometimes even shed tears, while you say to Me: 'My Father, my God! give me wealth!' If I were to give it to you, you would think yourself of some importance, you would fancy you had gained something very great. Yet because you asked for it you have it. But take care to make good use of it. Before you had it you were humble; now that you have begun to be rich you despise the poor! What kind of a good is that which only makes you worse? For worse you are, since you were bad already. And that it would make you worse you knew not, hence you asked it of Me. I gave it to you and I proved you; you have found--and you are found out! You were hidden when you had nothing. Correct thyself! Vomit up this cupidity! Take a draught of charity!... Ask of Me better things than these, greater things than these. Ask of Me spiritual things. Ask of Me Myself!" (_Sermon_, cccxi. 14-15).
II. Is Religion a Virtue?
A virtue is that which both renders its possessor, as also his work, good. Hence we must say that every good act comes under virtue. And it is clear that to render to another what is his due has the character of a good act; for by the fact that a man renders to another his due there is established a certain fitting proportion and order between them. But order comes under the ratio of good, just as do measure and species, as S. Augustine establishes. Since, then, it belongs to religion to render to some one, namely, God, the honour which is His due, it is clear that religion is a virtue.
Some, however, deny this, thus:
1. It belongs to religion to show reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear, and fear is a gift. Religion, then, is a gift, not a virtue.
To reverence God is indeed an act of the gift of fear. But to religion it belongs to do certain things by reason of our reverence for God. Hence it does not follow that religion is the same thing as the gift of fear, but it is related to it as to a higher principle. For the gifts are superior to the moral virtues.
2. All virtue consists in the free-will, and hence virtue is called an elective or voluntary habit. But _latria_ belongs to religion, and _latria_ implies a certain servitude. Hence religion is not a virtue.
But even a servant can freely give to his master the service that is his due and thus "make a virtue of necessity" by voluntarily paying his debt. And similarly the payment of due service to God can be an act of virtue according as a man does it voluntarily.
3. Lastly, as is said in Aristotle's _Ethics_, the aptitude for the virtues is implanted in us by nature; hence those things which come under the virtues arise from the dictates of natural reason; but it belongs to religion to offer external reverence to the Divine Nature. Ceremonial, however, or external reverence, is not due to the dictates of natural reason. Hence religion is not a virtue.
But it is due to the dictates of natural reason that a man does certain things in order to show reverence to God. That he should do precisely this or that, however, does not come from the dictates of natural reason, but from Divine or human positive law.
III. Is Religion One Virtue?
S. Paul says to the Ephesians: _One God, one faith._ But true religion maintains faith in one God. Consequently religion is one virtue.
Habits are distinguished according to the divers objects with which they are concerned. But it belongs to religion to show reverence for the One God for one particular reason, inasmuch, namely, as He is the First Principle, the Creator and Governor of all things; hence we read in Malachi: _If I am a Father, where is my honour?_ for it is the father that produces and governs. Hence it is clear that religion is but one virtue.
But some maintain that religion is not one virtue, thus:
1. By religion we are ordained to God. But in God there are Three Persons, and, moreover, divers attributes which are at least distinguishable from one another by reason. But the diverse character of the objects on which they fall suffices to differentiate the virtues. Hence religion is not one virtue.
But the Three Divine Persons are but One Principle as concerns the creation and the government of things. And consequently They are to be served by one religion. And the divers attributes all concur in the First Principle, for God produces all and governs all by His Wisdom, His Will, and the power of His Goodness. Hence religion is but one virtue.
2. One virtue can have but one act; for habits are differentiated according to their acts. But religion has many acts, _e.g._, to worship, to serve, to make vows, to pray, to make sacrifices, and many other similar things. Consequently religion is not one virtue.
But by one and the same act does man serve God and worship Him; for worship is referred to God's excellence, to which is due reverence: service regards man's subjection, for by reason of his condition he is bound to show reverence to God. And under these two heads are comprised all the acts which are attributed to religion; for by them all man makes protestation of the Divine excellence and of his subjection of himself to God, either by offering Him something, or, again, by taking upon himself something Divine.
3. Further, adoration belongs to religion. But adoration is paid to images for one reason and to God for another. But since diversity of "reason" serves to differentiate the virtues, it seems that religion is not one virtue.
But religious worship is not paid to images considered in themselves as entities, but precisely as images bringing God Incarnate to our mind. Further, regarding an image precisely as an image of some one, we do not stop at it; it carries us on to that which it represents. Hence the fact that religious veneration is paid to images of Christ in no sense means that there are various kinds of _latria_, nor different virtues of religion.
IV. Is Religion a Special Virtue Distinct From Others?
Religion is regarded as a part of Justice, and is distinct from the other parts of Justice.
Since virtue is ordained to what is good, where there exists some special ratio of good there must be some special corresponding virtue. But the particular good towards which religion is ordained is the showing due honour to God. Honour, however, is due by reason of some excellency. And to God belongs pre-eminent excellence, since He in every possible way infinitely transcends all things. Hence special honour is due to Him; just as we note that in human concerns varying honours are due to the varying excellencies of persons; one is the honour of a father, another that of a king, and so on. Hence it is manifest that religion is a special virtue.
Some, however, maintain that religion is not a special virtue distinct from others, thus:
1. S. Augustine says: "True sacrifice is every work undertaken in order that we may be joined to God in holy fellowship." But sacrifice comes under religion. Every work of virtue therefore comes under religion. And consequently it is not a special virtue.
But every work of virtue is said to be a sacrifice in so far as it is directed to showing God reverence. It does not thence follow that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all the other virtues.
2. The Apostle says to the Corinthians: _Do all to the glory of God._ But it belongs to religion to do some things for the glory of God. Hence religion is not a special virtue.
But all kinds of acts, in so far as they are done for the glory of God, come under religion; not, however, as though it elicited them, but inasmuch as it controls them. Those acts, however, come under religion as eliciting them which, by their own specific character, pertain to the service of God.
3. Lastly, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity by which we love our neighbour. But in the _Ethics_ it is said: "To be honoured is akin to being loved." Hence religion by which God is honoured is not a specifically distinct virtue from those observances, whether _dulia_ or piety, whereby we honour our neighbour. Hence it is not a special virtue.
But the object of love is a _good_ thing; whereas the object of honour or reverence is what is _excellent_. But it is God's Goodness that is communicated to His creatures, not the excellence of His Goodness. Hence while the charity wherewith we love God is not a distinct virtue from the charity wherewith we love our neighbour, yet the religion whereby we honour God is distinct from the virtues whereby we honour our neighbour.
V. Is Religion One of the Theological Virtues?
Religion is considered a part of Justice, and this is a moral virtue.
Religion is the virtue whereby we offer to God His due honour. Two things have therefore to be considered in religion. First we have to consider what religion offers God, namely, worship: this may be regarded as the material and the object with which religion is concerned. Secondly, we have to consider Him to Whom it is offered, namely, God Himself. Now, when worship is offered to God it is not as though our worshipful acts touched God, though this is the case when we believe God, for by believing in God we touch Him (and we have therefore said elsewhere that God is the object of our faith not simply inasmuch as we believe in God, but inasmuch as we believe God). Due worship, however, is offered to God in that certain acts whereby we worship Him are performed as homage to Him, the offering sacrifice, for instance, and so forth. From all which it is evident that God does not stand to the virtue of religion as its object or as the material with which it is concerned, but as its goal. And consequently religion is not a theological virtue, for the object of these latter is the ultimate end; but religion is a moral virtue, and the moral virtues are concerned with the means to the end.
But some regard religion as a theological virtue, thus:
1. S. Augustine says: "God is worshipped by faith, hope, and charity," and these are theological virtues. But to offer worship to God comes under religion. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
But it is always the case that a faculty or a virtue whose object is a certain end, controls--by commanding--those faculties or virtues which have to do with those things which are means to that end. But the theological virtues--_i.e._, faith, hope, and charity--are directly concerned with God as their proper object. And hence they are the cause--by commanding it--of the act of the virtue of religion which does certain things having relation to God. It is in this sense that S. Augustine says that "God is worshipped by faith, hope, and charity."
2. Those are called theological virtues which have God for their object. But religion has God for its object, for it directs us to God alone. Therefore it is a theological virtue.
But religion directs man to God, not indeed as towards its object, but as towards its goal.
3. Lastly, every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral. But religion is not an intellectual virtue, for its perfection does not consist in the consideration of the truth. Neither is it a moral virtue, for the property of the moral virtues is to steer a middle course betwixt what is superfluous and what is below the requisite; whereas no one can worship God to excess, according to the words of Ecclesiasticus: _For He is above all praise._ Religion, then, can only be a theological virtue.
But religion is neither an intellectual nor a theological virtue, but a moral virtue, for it is part of justice. And the _via media_ in religion lies, not between the passions, but in a certain harmony which it establishes in the acts which are directed towards God. I say "a certain," not an absolute harmony, for we can never show to God all the worship that is His due; I mean, then, the harmony arising from the consideration of our human powers and of the Divine acceptance of what we offer. Moreover, there can be excess in those things which have to do with the Divine worship; not indeed as regards quantity, but in certain other circumstances, as, for example, when Divine worship is offered to whom it should not, or at times when it should not, or in other unfitting circumstances.
VI. Is Religion to be preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
In Exodus the commandments which concern religion are put first, as though they were of primary importance. But the order of the commandments is proportioned to the order of the virtues; for the commandments of the Law fall upon the acts of the virtues. Hence religion is chief among the moral virtues.
The means to an end derive their goodness from their relation to that end; hence the more nigh they are to the end the better they are. But the moral virtues are concerned with those things which are ordained to God as their goal. And religion approaches more nearly to God than do the other moral virtues, inasmuch as it is occupied with those things which are directly and immediately ordained to the Divine honour. Hence religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
Some, however, deny that religion is pre-eminent among the moral virtues, thus:
1. The perfection of a moral virtue lies in this, that it keeps the due medium. But religion fails to attain the medium of justice, for it does not render to God anything absolutely equal to Him. Hence religion is not better than the other moral virtues.
But the praiseworthiness of a virtue lies in the will, not in the power. Hence to fall short of equality--which is the midpath of justice--for lack of power, does not make virtue less praiseworthy, provided the deficiency is not due to the will.
2. Again, in our service of men a thing seems to be praiseworthy in proportion to the need of him whom we assist; hence it is said in Isaias: _Deal thy bread to the hungry._ But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to the Psalmist: _I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods._ Hence religion seems to be less praiseworthy than the other virtues, for by them man is succoured.
But in the service we render to another for his profit, that is the more praiseworthy which is rendered to the most needy, because it is of greater profit to him. But no service is rendered to God for His profit--for His glory, indeed, but for our profit.
3. Lastly, the greater the necessity for doing a thing the less worthy it is of praise, according to the words: _For if I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me._ But the greater the debt the greater the necessity. Since, then, the service which man offers to God is the greatest of debts, it would appear that religion is the least praiseworthy of all human virtues.
Where necessity comes in the glory of supererogation is non-existent; but the merit of the virtue is not thereby excluded, provided the will be present. Consequently the argument does not follow.
VII. Has Religion, That is Latria, any External Acts?
In Ps. lxxxiii. 3 it is said: _My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God._ Now interior acts belong to the heart, and in the same way exterior acts are referred to the members of the body. It appears, then, that God is to be worshipped by exterior as well as by interior acts.
We do not show reverence and honour to God for His own sake--for He in Himself is filled with glory to which nought can be added by any created thing--but for our own sakes. For by the fact that we reverence and honour God our minds are subjected to Him, and in that their perfection lies; for all things are perfected according as they are subjected to that which is superior to them--the body, for instance, when vivified by the soul, the air when illumined by the sun. Now the human mind needs--if it would be united to God--the guidance of the things of sense; for, as the Apostle says to the Romans: _The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made_. Hence in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of certain corporal acts, so that by their means, as by certain signs, man's mind may be stirred up to those spiritual acts whereby it is knit to God. Consequently religion has certain interior acts which are its chief ones and which essentially belong to it; but it has also external acts which are secondary and which are subordinated to the interior acts.
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Some deny, however, that exterior acts belong to religion or _latria_, thus:
1. In S. John iv. 24 we read: _For God is a Spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth._ External acts belong, however, rather to the body than to the spirit. Consequently religion, which comprises adoration, has no exterior acts, but only interior.
But here the Lord speaks only of that which is chiefest and which is essentially intended in Divine worship.
2. The end of religion is to show reverence and honour to God. But it is not reverent to offer to a superexcellent person what properly belongs to inferiors. Since, then, what a man offers by bodily acts seems more in accordance with men's needs and with that respect which we owe to inferior created beings, it does not appear that it can fittingly be made use of in order to show reverence to God.
But such external acts are not offered to God as though He needed them, as He says in the Psalm: _Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?_ But such acts are offered to God as signs of those interior and spiritual works which God accepts for their own sakes. Hence S. Augustine says: "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament--that is, the visible sign--of the invisible sacrifice."
3. Lastly, S. Augustine praises Seneca for his condemnation of those men who offered to their idols what they were wont to offer to men: on the ground, namely, that what belongs to mortal men is not fittingly offered to the immortals. Still less, then, can such things be fittingly offered to the True God Who is _above all gods_. Therefore to worship God by means of bodily acts seems to be reprehensible. And consequently religion does not include bodily acts.
But idolaters are so called because they offer to their idols things belonging to men, and this not as outward signs which may excite in them spiritual affections, but as being acceptable by those idols for their own sake. And especially because they offered them empty and vile things.
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_S. Augustine:_ When men pray, they, as becomes suppliants, make use of their bodily members, for they bend the knee, they stretch forth their hands, they even prostrate on the ground and perform other visible acts. Yet all the while their invisible will and their heart's intention are known to God. He needs not these signs for the human soul to be laid bare before Him. But man by so doing stirs himself up to pray and groan with greater humility and fervour. I know not how it is that whereas such bodily movements can only be produced by reason of some preceding act on the part of the soul, yet when they are thus visibly performed the interior invisible movement which gave them birth is thereby itself increased, and the heart's affections--which must have preceded, else such acts would not have been performed--are thereby themselves increased.
Yet none the less, if a man be in some sort hindered so that he is not at liberty to make use of such external acts, the interior man does not therefore cease to pray; in the secret chamber of his heart, where lies compunction, he lies prostrate before the eyes of God (_Of Care for the Dead_, v.).
VIII. Is Religion the Same as Sanctity?
In S. Luke's Gospel we read: _Let us serve Him in holiness and justice._ But to serve God comes under religion. Hence religion is the same as sanctity.
The word "sanctity" seems to imply two things. First, it seems to imply _cleanness_; and this is in accordance with the Greek word for it, for in Greek it is _hagios_, as though meaning "without earth." Secondly, it implies _stability_, and thus among the ancients those things were termed _sancta_ which were so hedged about with laws that they were safe from violation; similarly a thing is said to be _sancitum_ because established by law. And even according to the Latins the word _sanctus_ may mean "cleanness," as derived from _sanguine tinctus_, for of old those who were to be purified were sprinkled with the blood of a victim, as says S. Isidore in his _Etymologies_.
And both meanings allow us to attribute sanctity to things which are used in the Divine worship; so that not men only, but also temples and vessels and other similar things are said to be sanctified by reason of their use in Divine worship. _Cleanness_ indeed is necessary if a man's mind is to be applied to God. For the mind of man is stained by being immersed in inferior things, as indeed all things are cheapened by admixture with things inferior to them--silver, for instance, when mixed with lead. And for our minds to be knit to the Supreme Being they must needs be withdrawn from inferior things. Without cleanness, then, the mind cannot be applied to God. Hence in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said: _Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God._
_Stability_ is also required if the mind is to be applied to God. For the mind is applied to Him as to the Ultimate End and First Principle, and consequently must be immovable. Hence the Apostle says: _For I am sure that neither death nor life shall separate me from the love of God._
Sanctity, then, is said to be that whereby man's mind and its acts are applied to God. Hence sanctity does not differ from religion essentially, but in idea only. For by religion we mean that a man offers God due service in those things which specially pertain to the Divine worship--sacrifices, for example, and oblations, etc.; but by sanctity we mean that a man not only offers these things, but also refers to God the works of the other virtues, and also that a man disposes himself by good works for the Divine worship.
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Some, however, deny the identity of religion and sanctity, thus:
1. Religion is a certain special virtue. But sanctity is called a general virtue, for according to Andronicus, sanctity is that which "makes men faithful observers of what is justly due to God." Hence sanctity is not the same as religion.
But sanctity is in its essence a special virtue, and as such is, in a sort, the same as religion. It has, however, a certain general aspect in that, by its commands, it directs all the acts of the virtues to the Divine Good. In the same way legal justice is termed a general virtue in that it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
2. Sanctity seems to imply cleanness, for S. Denis says: "Sanctity is freedom from all impurity; it is perfect and stainless cleanness." Cleanness, however, seems to come under temperance, for this it is which precludes bodily defilement. Since, then, religion comes under justice, sanctity cannot be identified with religion.
Temperance indeed worketh cleanness, but this has not the ratio of sanctity except it be referred to God. Hence S. Augustine says of virginity itself that "not because it is virginity is it held in honour, but because it is consecrated to God."
3. Lastly, things that are contradistinguished are not identical. But in all enumerations of the parts of justice sanctity is set against religion.
But sanctity is set against religion because of the difference aforesaid; they differ indeed in idea, not in substance.
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_Cajetan:_ Religion is directly concerned with those things which specially pertain to the Divine worship--ceremonies, for example, sacrifices, oblations, etc. Whereas sanctity directly regards the mind, and through the mind the other virtuous works, including those of religion ... for it makes use of them so as thereby to apply the mind--and by consequence all acts that proceed from the human mind--to God. Thus we see that many religious people are not saints, whereas all saints are religious. For people who devote themselves to ceremonies, sacrifices, etc., can be termed religious; but they can only be called saints in so far as by means of these things they give themselves interiorly to God (_on_ 2. 2. 81. 8).
Question LXXXII: Of Devotion
 _De invent. Rhetor._, ii. 53.
 _Etymolog._, x. _sub litt._ R.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 3.
 _Of the True Religion_, lv.
 St. Jas. i. 27.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 1.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 1.
 Gal. v. 13.
 The objection and its solution turn upon the Latin words _cultus_ and _colere_, which cannot be consistently rendered in English; "reverence" is perhaps the most appropriate translation here.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 1.
 Gal. iv. 14.
 Rom. viii. 31.
 Ps. xv. 5.
 Ps. lxxvi. 1.
 _Of the Nature of Good_, iii.
 _Fear_ is one of the "Gifts" of the Holy Ghost.
 S. Jerome, _Ep._ LIV., _alias_ X., _ad Furiam_.
 II., vi. 15.
 iv. 5-6.
 i. 6.
 The Latin word _ordinare_ means "to set in due order"; there is no precise English equivalent which can be consistently employed.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 6.
 II. x. 31.
 VIII. viii. 1.
 2. 2. Qu. II., Art. 2.
 _Enchiridion_, iii.
 xliii. 33.
 xx. 1-17.
 _Ethics_, II. vi.
 lviii. 7.
 Ps. xv. 2.
 1 Cor. ix. 16.
 See p. 30.
 i. 20.
 Ps. xlix. 13.
 _Of the City of God_, x. 5.
 _Ibid._, vi. 10.
 Ps. xciv. 3.
 i. 74-75.
 Thus Origen, _Hom._ XI, i. _in Leviticum_, where, however, he is not really giving an etymology.
 X., _sub litt._ S.
 xii. 14.
 Rom. viii. 38-39.
 _De Affectibus_.
 _Of the Divine Names_, xii.
 _Of Virginity_, viii.
On Prayer and the Contemplative Life by St. Thomas Aquinas
Question LXXXI: Of the Virtue of Religion
Question LXXXII: Of Devotion
Question LXXXIII: Of Prayer
Question LXXII: Of the Prayers of the Saints who are in Heaven
Question CLXXIX: Of the Division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative
Question CLXXX: Of the Contemplative Life
Question CLXXXI: Of the Active Life
Question CLXXXII: Of the Comparison between the Active and the Contemplative Life
Question CLXXXVI: On the Religious State
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